What Is the Voluntary Cessation Doctrine?
Explore the legal doctrine that prevents defendants from strategically ending a lawsuit, examining how courts distinguish a temporary halt from a permanent resolution.
Explore the legal doctrine that prevents defendants from strategically ending a lawsuit, examining how courts distinguish a temporary halt from a permanent resolution.
In the American legal system, a lawsuit can be dismissed if the underlying issue resolves itself, a principle known as mootness. This prevents courts from issuing opinions on disputes that no longer exist. The voluntary cessation doctrine, however, is an important exception to this rule. It dictates that a defendant cannot automatically have a case dismissed simply by stopping the allegedly illegal conduct that prompted the lawsuit. The doctrine is meant to prevent a party from halting its actions just long enough to evade a court ruling, only to resume the behavior once the legal threat has passed.
The function of the voluntary cessation doctrine is to uphold the integrity of the judicial process. It prevents defendants from sidestepping a potentially unfavorable court judgment by temporarily altering their behavior. Without this legal principle, a party could cease a challenged activity, have the case declared moot, and then be free to restart the same conduct without legal consequence from the original lawsuit.
To prevent such maneuvering, the courts have established a standard for when a case can be dismissed for mootness based on a defendant’s change in conduct. The burden of proof falls entirely on the defendant, the party asserting the case is moot. The Supreme Court has characterized this as a “heavy burden.”
The established legal test requires the defendant to make it “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” The court must be convinced that subsequent events have made a return to the challenged behavior highly improbable. A simple promise or a change in internal policy that can be easily reversed is generally insufficient to meet this burden of proof.
While the burden to prove voluntary cessation is high, it is not insurmountable. Courts have recognized specific circumstances where a defendant’s actions are sufficient to render a case moot because they involve changes that are formal, structural, and not easily undone.
One of the clearest examples is when a government body permanently repeals or amends the law or regulation that was being challenged in the lawsuit. If a city council formally rescinds a challenged ordinance through its official legislative process, the legal basis for the plaintiff’s claim is extinguished. This action is considered a definitive cessation because reversing it would require a new, public legislative process.
Another scenario involves corporate or organizational changes. If a company completely and irreversibly ceases the line of business associated with the lawsuit, the case may be deemed moot. This could involve selling off a division, permanently closing a manufacturing plant, or formally dissolving the corporate entity altogether.
A defendant can also meet the burden by entering into a binding legal agreement that prevents future conduct. For instance, in a trademark dispute, a defendant might offer the plaintiff a formal and unconditional covenant not to sue, promising never to engage in the allegedly infringing activity again. If this covenant is comprehensive enough, a court might find that it has eliminated the controversy between the parties.
The application of the voluntary cessation doctrine is illustrated in key Supreme Court decisions. A foundational case is Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. In this matter, an environmental group sued a company for repeatedly violating the Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants into a river. After the lawsuit was filed, the defendant shut down the industrial facility responsible for the pollution.
Laidlaw argued that closing the facility made the case moot because it had voluntarily ceased the polluting activity. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court reasoned that the defendant carried the “heavy burden” of proving that the wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Simply closing the facility was not enough, as the company still held the necessary operating permits and could potentially reopen the plant or sell it to another operator who might continue the pollution.
In contrast, the case of Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. demonstrates a situation where the burden was successfully met. Nike sued Already for trademark infringement over a shoe design. In response, Already filed a counterclaim, seeking a court declaration that Nike’s trademark was invalid. To end the litigation, Nike issued a “Covenant Not to Sue,” a legally binding promise that it would never raise a trademark claim against Already’s current or similar future shoe designs.
The Supreme Court concluded that this covenant was so broad and unconditional that it eliminated any real threat of a future lawsuit from Nike against Already. This comprehensive legal promise made it clear that the challenged behavior—Nike’s litigation threats—could not reasonably be expected to recur. As a result, the Court found that Already’s counterclaim was moot because Nike had successfully met its heavy burden.