Missing Trader Fraud: Red Flags and Business Consequences
Legitimate businesses can be implicated in VAT fraud schemes. Understand the transactional patterns and due diligence needed to protect your input tax claims.
Legitimate businesses can be implicated in VAT fraud schemes. Understand the transactional patterns and due diligence needed to protect your input tax claims.
Missing trader fraud represents a sophisticated exploitation of the European Union’s Value-Added Tax (VAT) system. This scheme, also known as Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud, is orchestrated by criminal enterprises to steal tax revenue, with losses estimated in the tens of billions of euros annually. The fraud abuses the rules for cross-border transactions between EU member states, which allow goods to move free of VAT. This lets criminals acquire goods, sell them domestically while charging VAT, and then disappear before remitting the collected tax to the government.
A basic missing trader scheme hinges on the EU’s VAT rules for cross-border transactions. When a VAT-registered business in one member state sells goods to a VAT-registered business in another, the transaction is zero-rated. This means the seller does not add VAT, and the buyer accounts for the tax in their own country through a reverse charge mechanism. Fraudsters exploit this by creating a “Missing Trader” company for the sole purpose of the fraud.
This Missing Trader acquires high-value, low-bulk goods, like mobile phones or computer chips, from a supplier in another EU member state without paying VAT. The Missing Trader then immediately sells these goods to a domestic company, but this time the invoice includes VAT at the standard local rate. The buyer pays the full price, including the VAT, to the Missing Trader.
Having collected a substantial amount of VAT, the Missing Trader vanishes without ever remitting the tax payment to the government. The company is often a shell corporation with false directors, making it difficult for authorities to trace the individuals involved or recover the stolen tax revenue. The entity may only operate for a few months before disappearing.
To add layers of complexity, the goods are often sold through a series of domestic companies known as “buffers.” These buffer companies buy and sell the goods from one another, each charging and paying VAT. These transactions create a paper trail that appears legitimate, distancing the final domestic buyer from the original fraudulent transaction.
Carousel fraud is a more complex evolution of the basic missing trader scheme, named for the circular path goods take, often returning to the country where the fraud originated. This variant involves both the theft of VAT from a domestic sale and fraudulent VAT refund claims on exports, compounding the financial losses for tax authorities. The scheme requires a higher level of coordination, involving multiple entities across different jurisdictions.
The process begins like a standard MTIC scheme, with a Missing Trader acquiring goods VAT-free and selling them domestically to a Buffer company, collecting VAT that is never remitted. The key difference emerges at the end of the domestic chain, where a “Conduit Company” or “Broker” purchases the goods. This entity’s role is to export the goods out of the country.
The export transaction is zero-rated for VAT, meaning the Conduit Company does not charge VAT to its foreign buyer. However, the Conduit Company can still file a claim with its tax authority to recover the input VAT it paid to the Buffer company. Since the VAT collected by the original Missing Trader was never paid, the state is defrauded twice: once on the unremitted VAT and again on the fraudulent refund.
To complete the “carousel,” the goods are sold to a company in another EU member state controlled by the same criminal organization. This foreign entity then sells the goods back to a company in the original member state, and the entire fraudulent cycle begins again with the same products. This circular movement allows fraudsters to repeatedly extract VAT from the system using a single batch of high-value items.
Businesses can become entangled in fraudulent chains without their knowledge, but certain transactional and commercial indicators should raise alarms.
When tax authorities uncover a missing trader fraud chain, the consequences for legitimate businesses that unwittingly participated are primarily financial. These consequences stem from a legal principle often summarized as the “knew or should have known” test. A tax authority does not need to prove a business was a willing conspirator, but only that it ignored clear warning signs that its transactions were connected to fraud.
The most direct consequence is the denial of its input VAT reclaim. A business normally recovers the VAT it pays on purchases by deducting it from the VAT it collects on sales. If an authority determines a business should have known it was dealing with a fraudulent supply chain, it can refuse to refund the input VAT paid on those transactions.
This denial results in a direct financial loss. For example, if a company purchased €500,000 worth of goods and paid an additional €100,000 in VAT, it would normally reclaim that €100,000. If the reclaim is denied, the effective cost of the goods becomes €600,000, likely erasing any profit and causing a significant cash flow problem. This administrative penalty is separate from any potential criminal proceedings.